Economic Sectionalism, Executive-Centered Partisanship, and the Politics of the State and Local Tax Deduction
The U.S. Tax Code allows citizens to reduce their overall tax liability by deducting the amount already paid in state and local taxes (SALT). In 2017 President Trump and the Republican Congress succeeded in capping the amount citizens could deduct in SALT. This policy development is reflective of broader changes in American federalism and party politics. I argue that Republicans succeed in limiting the tax deduction after decades of failed efforts because of changes to the geographic distribution of the parties' support, and the increasing centrality of presidential politics to both parties' electoral fate. I document how the SALT deduction has become more partisan and geographically stratified; increasingly, SALT's benefits have become concentrated in specific areas of the country that also overwhelmingly vote for the Democratic Party in U.S. Presidential Elections. I also present the results of a survey experiment that shows the political power behind SALT's partisan framing. Citizens are highly attuned to SALT's partisan inequities and they can make sense of this complicated fiscal policy in partisan terms. Yet, in choosing to emphasize partisanship over income inequality, political elites masked over the policy effects of the SALT deduction, limiting the extent to which public policy mirrors public opinion.
Unbalanced and Mad: Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and the Geographic Sources of Government Distrust in the American Public Not all states are treated equally when it comes to federal tax policy. Some states receive more funding than they send in tax revenue to the federal government, while others send more than they get back. This is the balance of payments problem. This paper presents experimental evidence to argue that disparate balance of payments causes Americans to view the federal government unfairly. Additionally, the evidence shows that Americans who live in states with negative balances of payments seek to penalize and raise taxes on states with comparatively positive balances of payments. This paper makes the case that public opinion and partisan politics are an important feature of fiscal federalism. Growing institutional distrust and geographic divisions in tax preference impinges on economic models of tax sorting and fiscal redistribution. In extending the research agenda on balance-of-payments problems to the realm of public opinion, this study broadens our collective understanding about the scope of federal and state power, and the conditions in which the public accepts governmental power to treat some places differently than others.
Creating Inter-State Cooperation and Contestation during the New Deal: The National Resources Planning Board and American Federalism, 1933-1960
Land use planning and natural resource conservation were not just essential policy reforms of the New Deal era – they were efforts to transform the politics of American federalism. Contrary to extant accounts that emphasize the New Deal’s preemption of local and state control, I argue that Franklin Roosevelt and his aides displayed a unique sensitivity to America’s historic “dilemma of scale.” Roosevelt consciously sought to preserve and expand essential elements of state and local governance, with a particular emphasis on the development of bureaucratic capacity, intergovernmental communication, and regional planning efforts. This essay traces the historical development of the National Resources Planning Board (1933-1943) and its successes in establishing a network of state planning agencies. State planners viewed their role broadly, and organized state-level responses to a vast number of policy problems. As a result, when Congress abolished the NRPB in 1943, planning remained a vibrant component of the newly “modernized” state governments. Federal efforts to extend national programs into areas traditionally dominated by state-level policymaking after the New Deal had to contend and cooperate with these prevailing administrative entities. These institutional trajectories and asymmetric developments reveal enduring insights about the ability of 20th Century presidents to pursue organizational and partisan ambitions in what scholars increasingly identify as America’s “executive centered federalism”
The Political Dynamics of “Creative Federalism”: President Johnson, the Mayors, and the Development of Federal-Local Urban Policy in the 1960s
Intergovernmental administrative and budgetary reforms were essential policy initiatives of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society. These goals differed from their Great Society counterparts because they focused on governmental reorganization and programmatic consolidation. Drawing on a wide range of archival evidence from the Johnson Presidential Library, I trace the political dynamics of how Johnson and metropolitan mayors responded to the political crisis insinuating American federalism. Urbanization and the fragmentation of political authority challenged the success of new federal programs. But rather than overtaking sub-national political authority, the Johnson administration devised new budgetary and management techniques for assuring “voluntary cooperation” between cities and the federal government. The development of these tools shed new light on the relationship between Johnson’s War on Poverty, and the administrative legacies subsequent presidents have had to contend with in enacting their own policies. By creating a federal-local policy, the Johnson administration ushered in a new vision of how executive-centered administrative action could help presidents achieve their programmatic goals by using local government. The momentum to enact a new “creative federalism” existed beyond any single program, and often deliberately disregarded Congressional action. By tracing the development of Johnson's signature Community Action Program into Model Cities, and in emphasizing stand-alone efforts to institutionalize intergovernmental negotiation, I highlight the role and incentives of executive in policy development and implementation. The history of Johnson’s creative federalism therefore offers important lessons in the origins of modern-day, “executive-centered federalism,” the nature of mayoral power in the planning and enactment of major federal programs, and the development of a distinct federal-local relationship in the mid-20th Century.
Party Organizations and Polycentric Governance: Political Party Reform, Administrative Consolidation, and Geographic Polarization in the Ostroms' Political Science
A common critique levied against the American constitutional system is that scant attention is paid to the ways in which the virtues or habits of mind necessary for that system's perpetuation are incentivized (Horwitz 1986; Storing 1981). The Ostroms offer several possible responses in their analysis of America's political system because of their collective emphasis on human capacity for meaningful deliberation and problem-solving: co-production in public goods (Aligica and Tarko 2013), multiple points of citizen access in overlapping jurisdictions (Ostrom, E. 1972), constitutional guarantees insuring the creation of new communities of interest (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961).
However, despite their prolific examination of American republicanism, the invention and development of the America's mass party system remains unexplored from the Ostroms' perspective. For many scholars, the advent of broad-based, national party organizations represents the seminal creation in America's constitutional experiment - an effort to create and then recreate the active, interested, and motivated citizenry necessary for self-rule. Absent political parties, the formal rules of the game -- separation of powers, federalism, bicameralism -- would scarcely follow the logic that political scientists, including the Ostroms, trace. This paper is an effort to correct that omission by reconciling these two complementary traditions within a common analytical framework. Given the Ostroms' overriding interest in the human capacity for self-government, that ideal framework is provided by the Bloomington School of political economy. In particular, this paper will highlight the various ways in which the American mass party system has intersected with various formal constitutional rules to: a) create citizens capable of self-governance in a mass democracy; b) referee disputes between multiple centers of power in a polycentric order; c) protect constitutional guarantees, given a decentralized organizational structure. The first section will more fully flesh out the connection between American progressivism, the doctrine of "responsible party government," and administrative centralization. The second part of the paper will elaborate on that tension and discuss how party organizations facilitate the civic and constitutional prerequisites for polycentrism in the American context. In other words, I argue that one reason this tension exists in Ostrom's developmental account is because his inquiry into party structure and democratic governance begins about 100 years into a long and deliberate process of constitutional reform. The final part of the paper will draw upon the insights from the Bloomington school's concern for underlying rules and emphasize the role that party organizations play in structuring the set of actions that elected officials have, and once had, as a result of rule changes governing party organization. Specific attention will be placed on how parties relate to the Ostroms' notion of "constitutional guarantees" - an essential condition for preserving overlapping, multiple jurisdictions of political choice.
Industrial Restructuring, Automation, and the Democratic Party Response, 1946-1963
The economic prosperity of the 1950s and early 1960s failed to reach many parts of the United States. Natural resource depletion, technological automation, and intra-national economic restructuring left thousands of communities wracked by unemployment and a diminished tax base for public investment. With the 1961 Area Redevelopment Act and the 1962 Manpower Development and Training Act, the federal government sought to ease the burden on state and local government for their economic hardship. These two landmark laws were not mere extensions of previous federal programs. Rather, they were deliberate attempts to not do what the federal government did before. They represent an under appreciated form of policy “feedback” – the creation of new policy initiatives in response to successful policies deemed politically toxic. This paper offers a complementary framework emphasizing how and why the political calculus of political elites often close off certain routes of policy change, even if those alternatives were programmatically successful. Tracing the policy history of two programs, I describe the political debate that led the federal government to emphasize regionalized public investment and job retraining for unemployed workers. It perhaps seems pre-ordained that the federal government would grow in the mid-20th Century to take on these programmatic obligations, but this overlooks important policy alternatives that were widespread in the previous two decades. Targeted resettlement and worker relocation were experimental projects administered during the New Deal and during World War II. Contemporaneous policy analysis suggested that these types of federal-state programs were viable options for ameliorating the economic restructuring of the post-war economy. Instead, the federal government chose a different route. Whether or not it was the more efficacious route is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I emphasize why the federal government ventured into these two largely new areas of economic activity. Ironically, I argue, the federal government grew at the behest of state and local political elites. These sub-national political pressures developed into a form of federated “rent-seeking,” as mayors and governors used their partisan leverage to encourage larger federal investment in regions and individuals.
In analyzing the emergence of these path-breaking programs, this paper takes seriously how federalism shaped the government’s role in establishing what would constitute the core of economic redevelopment for the next 40 years. In doing so, I suggest that narratives emphasizing national preemption of state and local activity – while not entirely inaccurate – nevertheless fall short in considering the ways in which states and localities enabled the growth of national administration. Constitutional theorists often consider federalism to be an important structure for capturing public discontent, for building political consensus, and for creating more flexible polices. The politics – and the counterfactuals exposed by such politics – suggest that federalism can also elevate the voices of the politically entrenched, stifle viable alternatives, and establish new, vested interests.